A rchive Date
[ 30-01-2003 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ Iraq ]
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[http://www.canoe.ca/Columnists/mansur_toronto.html
Iraq's long, shameful record of deceit
By SALIM MANSUR - For the Toronto Sun
January 30, 2003
The popular saying that the devil is in the details applies to the reports by Dr. Hans Blix and Dr. Mohamed El Baradei of the UN inspection team in Iraq and the IAEA respectively, given to the Security Council on Monday.
In whatever manner these reports are read and understood, the readings will invariably be influenced by prior technical understandings and political stances assumed by governments and peoples around the world. In this matter my own reading of the reports is no different than those of others self-conscious of such considerations.
There were no revelations of "smoking guns" because the task at hand for the inspection teams was rather different.
The Security Council Resolution 1441 of Nov. 8, 2002 stipulated the inspections teams to report back, within 60 days after the resumption of inspections, on whether or not Iraq - already in material breach of prior resolutions - was in full and unconditional compliance of disarmament requirements as set forth in Resolution 687.
Blix's report was more grim than that of El Baradei. The introduction of Blix's report summarized the situation: "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today - of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace."
Blix found Saddam's regime in violation of precisely stipulated requirements dealing with biological and chemical weapons in terms of providing evidence of their production and destruction. He also found Iraq testing missiles exceeding the prohibited range of 150 km.
The repeated reference to Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991 in Resolution 1441 and the recent reports of the inspection teams needs understanding if the full extent of Iraqi non-compliance is to be appreciated. Resolution 687 has been characterized by some commentators as the "mother of all resolutions." It was the longest, most detailed and comprehensive resolution ever drafted, voted upon and passed by the Security Council.
Resolution 687 in effect was the terms of surrender imposed on Iraq at the end of the Gulf War. Saddam accepted unconditionally, in order to survive the humiliating military defeat at the hands of the UN coalition mobilized in liberating Kuwait, to place key aspects of Iraq's internal affairs under UN supervision.
Among conditions set forth in Resolution 687 were Iraqi requirements for full disclosure and disarmament of all its biological and chemical weapons and facilities, its inventory of ballistic missiles and production capabilities above a 150 km range, and all nuclear materials.
The Security Council required Iraq to submit a plan of monitoring and verification of its compliance within 120 days of the resolution's passage.
The Iraqi responsibility, given its unconditional acceptance, was to come clean and remain transparent in abiding by the requirements, thereby bringing to an end UN sanctions imposed at the beginning of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
The history of Resolution 687 has been one long record of Iraqi non-compliance, deceit, obfuscation and, in brazen disregard of the stipulations, engaging in secrecy to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
The UN response to Iraqi non-compliance has been a shameful appeasement of the murderous despot in Baghdad.
The political climate changed after 9/11. The probability of collusion between a murderous rogue regime in non-compliance with UN requirements and a criminal gang of international terrorists was no longer a matter of a hypothetical, academic debate.
Resolution 1441 was a direct result of 9/11. It reminded the world that while the Iraqi regime had been given 120 days to comply with Resolution 687 in April 1991, Saddam had outwitted the world for the more than 11 years since, and the world had supinely gone along with his deceit and non-compliance.
The international civil servants working for the UN and its agency have provided their initial findings as required. Now the decision of how and when to disarm Iraq or, even better, dismantle the brutal regime and dispose of the tyrant is a political decision awaiting the members of the Security Council.
Salim Mansur is a professor of political science at the University of Western Ontario. His column appears alternate Thursdays. He can be reached at smansurca@yahoo.ca
 World Fact Book (CIA)]
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