A rchive Date
[ 17-07-2005 ]
Category
[ Sociology ]
sub-Categoy
[ Darwinism ]
|
[http://www.uq.net.au/~zzlrietb/essays/nf_degler1.html
In Search of Human Nature: the Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought
Author: Carl N. Degler
Publisher: New York: Oxford University Press, 400pp.
Year: 1991
Carl N. Degler was born in 1921 and grew up at a time when racism and eugenics were serious considerations of the zeitgeist. As a result, he, too, had become indoctrinated by it. But in virtue of a thorough education, as he contends, Degler actively challenged such conceptions in voice and in print, and joined the wave of intellectual dissent that proved to be the coup de grâce in favour of culture, human experience or 'history' as providing the primary source of explanation for the differences between human groups.
The first two of the three parts of In Search of Human Nature are devoted to this thesis: an account of the impact of Darwinism on social scientific thought in the earlier part of this century, and of the definite shift toward a cultural paradigm during, in particular, the 1920's and 1930's. It is within this period that Degler provides a detailed sketch and analysis of the thought of the key social scientific contributors in bringing about this shift.
As Degler argues however, this shift was not due to, in the main, an adherence to any impartial social scientific methodology, but to, rather, a desire to extricate biology from any account of the behaviour of human social groups (individual inheritances notwithstanding) for fear of the negative consequences of social policy developed under the central and decisive influence of a strict, deterministic, biological paradigm.
It is from this background that Degler follows with an account, in part three, of the return of biology in explaining the behaviour of human social groups. The return had been motivated, he maintains, from two sources: a 'renewed recognition of Darwinian evolutionary theory'(1) and of the relevance of the work of ethology(2) in the search for a nature that may prove universal for humanity.
Although Degler concedes that this pattern is still unfolding (the book is only 5 years old), he stresses that it is not a retro-shift to the ideologies of the past; it is not a shift back to the naïve claims that sought to argue, on the Darwinian account, for differences in race and sex that are extant in 19th and 20th century American history (of which he devotes entire chapters), but one that has matured from these excesses such that, on his account, are given no justification, neither for the period in which they first emerged, nor in the present.
In Chapter 1, Degler discusses the first signs of Darwinian thought in the social sciences of the 19th century, through a discussion of Darwin's theory of Natural Selection, and its relation to human behaviour.
In the Origin of Species, Darwin only hinted at the implications of Natural Selection for human behaviour, but provided a full account of it in the Descent of Man twelve years later. Degler argues that the advocates of social Darwinism, the pernicious movement at the time that believed the state should adopt a lazziez faire political economy with no restraints on the economic behaviour of its citizens had little bearing on Darwin's theory.
Herbert Spencer, the English philosopher and most prominent advocate of social Darwinism had been the one to coin the term 'survival of the fittest', and Spencer, much more than Darwin himself, considered evolution to be the main driving force behind the 'progress' of humankind.
Despite this mild parallel between Darwin and Spencer, Degler points out that in the Descent, Darwin was at least positive about the role of 'virtuous habits', such as sympathy, by which humankind may be freed from higher and lower impulses, and hence distinguished as a species from (other) animals.
This positive aspect of Darwin's theory was evident in the thought of the social scientists of the time, namely, Albion Small, F. A. Giddings, C. A. Cooley, and Edward Ross. Degler points out, however, that unfortunately, social Darwinism had endured and spread, not so much to Spencer's influence, but Darwin's belief in the existence of a hierarchical structure to human society.
Furthermore, Darwin's account was in agreement with the Lamarckian principle of acquired characteristics,
whereby one generation may acquire, through evolutionary change, the characteristics that enabled previous generations to survive and reproduce (cf. Natural Selection). Lamarkianism had a similarly, enduring, negative impact on social science at the time.
In Chapter 2, Degler traces the beginnings of another pernicious force extant in the late 1800's and early 1900's - eugenics. He provides an account of the influence of H.H. Goddard, R.L. Dugdale, H.S. Jennings and Francis Galton. Degler points out that eugenics was clearly elitist in its attitude to differing human groups on the basis of heredity. Eugenics had become most fashionable as a tool for social reform around the time of the first world war, and the extent of its impact in this sense had been greatest in the testing of recruits for the war. A similar impact of heredity on the belief in the superiority of certain human groups was evident in American Immigration policy at the time; though, Degler points out that it would be incorrect to ascribe this to the influence of the acceptance of differences in the intelligence immigrants amoung social scientists, because many of them were beginning to doubt that biology played a central role in shaping human intelligence and behaviour.
Chapter 3 begins Section 2, where Degler accounts for the growing number of social scientists that sought explanations for the differences between human intelligence and behaviour in culture rather than biology.
The beginnings of this dissent from Darwinian thought was with Russell Wallace, a colleague of Darwin that later came into disagreement with him over some fundamental ideas.
The basis for Wallace's Disagreement, Degler points out, was in his belief that the human brain was a morepowerful instrument than was required for human survival, including those of Primitive human groups that were highly discriminated against by eugenicists.
Wallace's influence was such that it would see the undermining of racists Conceptions in America, through the impact of the theoretical formulation of Wallace's ideas by the immigrant anthropologist, Franz Boas.
Boas' impact on the social sciences cannot be underestimated, argues Degler, though his efforts were undertaken at the same time that the eugenics movement was accruing more and more supporters, and that certain laws were being passed for racial segregation in the American South. Degler writes, Boa's rejection of the traditional view was truly radical; it simply denied the existence of any significant difference in mental or social function. That there were observable social differences was undeniable, but the explanation for those differences, Boas maintained, was that they were the product of different histories, not different biological experiences(3).
Ironically, Boas justified his claims on biological, rather than environmental grounds. For Boas, it was the large biological differences within a particular race that undermined the concept of race itself. This was one reason, Degler argues, for Boas advocating any policy that condoned intermarriage between, for example, white Americans and Negroes.
For Boas, it was the perception of differences in human groups that formed the basis for discrimination and racial prejudice between them, not biological differences per se.
Another key figure in movement of social scientists away from biology as an explanatory source of the behavioural differences between human groups, as Degler points out in Chapter 4, was Alfred L. Kroeber.
The prediction made by Kroeber that social science was to include biology in its explanations of human behaviour was to eventually come about, yet only after it was completely dispensed with. The rest of Degler's book seeks to account for the unfolding of this very prediction.
In Chapter 5, Degler examines the same trends away from biological or hereditarian explanations in sex differences in humans.
For Darwin, there were clearly defined roles for both men and women according to the biology of each. For instance, Darwin saw women as cooperative by nature, and men as competitive by nature, which served to explain the 'higher eminence' of men over women throughout phylogeny. It was, however, a 19th century conception of men and women as each having 'separate spheres' of life that led, Degler argues, to the downfall of this Darwinian conception of sex differences.
By virtue of the home as being the 'sphere' of women, this important role justified her need for higher education, the effect of which led to an undermining of any biological basis for sex differences in the differing achievements of men and women.
Degler cites a number of important writers around the turn of the century that reflect this change; namely, Gamble and Ward, Gilman, Lydia Commander, M. W. Calkins, Amy Tanner, and notably, H. B. Thompson. Thompson, along with Tanner and Calkins, found through their Psychological research that the influence of culture marked the differences between the sexes, rather than biology, as believed by Darwin and his advocates.
Degler then accounts for the influence of Margeret Mead who observed the fundamental role biology played in the sex differences as evinced by a culture's organisation. The recurrent job of civilization was to keep redefining the male role, just in case men failed to satisfy their need for achievement - something women had done by virtue of their maternal role.
Mead, Degler concedes, marked the beginnings of a return of biology to explanations of sex differences.
In Chapter 6, 7 and 8, Degler provides further evidence of the shift of social scientific thought away from biology and toward culture as an explanation for differences in human behaviour; in particular, these chapters provide what Degler took to be overwhelming evidence against some of previous conceptions of what was thought to be salient biological differences along the dimensions of sex, race and intelligence.
For example, Degler cites the work of the psychologist Carl Murchison, whose work amoung prison inmates in the early 1920's showed that the intelligence of the inmates to be, on average, 75 per cent higher than the intelligence of the prison guards, leading to the conclusion that criminality could not be, simply, an inheritable characteristic as was previously thought. Degler pointed to the Realisation by social scientists, such a Kroeber, that biology had done little to understand or ameliorate social problems; eugenics, for instance, could not measure the complex differences in the moral, economic, and intellectual status of various human groups.
Unlike the concept of human instincts, however, advocates of the biological differences in intelligence helped that debate endure for the longest period of time, despite serious criticism to the contrary.
In the last section of the book, Degler gives an account of the return of biology and heredity to explanations of the differences in human behaviour, by focusing on, firstly, ideas that had been undermined in the wake of the paradigm-shift away from biology by Boas of the 19th century, and of proponents of the environmentalist assault on biological explanations in the 1920's and 1930's (Chapter 9).
Degler points out, however, that this shift did not include a return to Darwinian theory at first, and neither was this return motivated or connected with the eugenics or social Darwinism movements as it once was. Degler notes the immense impact of behaviourism in the 'triumph' (as he calls it) of culture as a source of explanations, though, he follows from this to note that psychology was the first social science to reconsider the role of biology in accounting for behavioural differences.
He also notes the advances in genetic research that were becoming more recognised by Psychologists for its respectability in the biological sciences.
A growing number of articles were appearing on biology, genetics and ethology in psychology. Degler notes one of the first references to sociobiology in a conference of psychologists in 1946 on the subject of Genetics and Human Behaviour, whereby the inauguration of a program of studies into psycho- and socio-biology was made. Degler notes the 'new visibility' of sociobiology much later on with the landmark book in 1975 by E. O. Wilson on ethology, called Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.
In Chapters 10, 11 and 12 of the Section 3 of the book, Degler assesses specific research that purports to show the necessary place of biology in explanations of differences in human behaviour.
Chapter 10 assesses whether or not there is any Biological basis to the origin of the taboo on incest, an aspect of differing human groups that seems to transcend culture.
In line with Darwin, notes Degler, that ethological evidence shows a definite reduction in reproductive success with inbreeding, and through an understanding of the continuity between animal and human species, we may come to appreciate why the practice of incest has always been greatly shunned by humans, regardless of their culture.
Chapter 11 assesses the various ways that the resurgence of biological explanations have influenced the various other fields of social science, such as politics and economics.
Chapter 12 Returns to an assessment of the new research in ethology in accounting for sex differences.
In the last Chapter of Section 3, Degler assesses the nature and extent to which biology, and in particular, evolutionary theory, may be used and misused in the social sciences. He cites the notable critique of sociobiology by S. J. Gould.
Degler concedes that the insertion of biology in accounting for differences in human behaviour is still in its infancy; furthermore, in his epilogue, Degler concludes that the efforts to trace through the implications of the evolutionary account of a human nature are likely to persist into the future, and that such a conception, if successful, is likely to be none less than radical.
Degler's book seemed to follow quite logically in the sense that he seems to have accounted well for the paradigm shifts that have occurred in social science over the last 100 years, and has structured his book with this in mind.
It is important to note, however, that his numerous citations do not seem to involve explicit and recurrent mention of the impact of Darwinism on social science; Degler chose to search for as many leads as he could in accounting for the social interconnections that led to his general thesis of the paradigm shifts, rather than remained wholly concerned with Darwinian aspects to all the research he has cited.
If his book succeeds on any grounds, it does so for not failing to cite every single social scientist that played some important role in the paradigm shifts that he argues have occurred in social science over the last 100 years(4).
It is difficult to say, however, whether all of these points were directly relevant to the impact of Darwinism and evolutionary theory on the modern history of social science, although he certainly returns to this issue centrally in the Epilogue.
Overall, Degler has given a fair treatment of the paradigm-shift back to biological explanations through the work of ethology and sociobiology, and many of the most important concepts, such as, for instance, reproductive success, altruism and kin selection, accounts of sex differences and human universals.
He has not been eager to avoid an appraisal of a small body of philosophic literature either, notably, of the work of Jeremy Bentham, John R. Searle, Elizabeth Wolgast, and, in particular, his close consideration of the criticisms of S. J. Gould.
His assessment of Gould is quite fair, in that Degler suggests that Gould and others remind us of the need to, once again, consider the role of environment, and, in particular, gene-environment interaction, in our explanations. The only criticism here is perhaps that he could have made Gould feature more centrally in his book, rather than just place him here and there when the inclusion seemed appropriate.
Degler has remarked, on a number of occasions, his basic philosophy that leads him to view the role of evolutionary theory as becoming, once again (as he predicts), quite central and indispensible to the social sciences, and in particular, to a formulation of an evolutionary account of human nature.
This philosophy has, at its core, the belief that Darwinism can make social science account for a human nature that is progressive but at the same time positive; Degler seems convinced that the intuitions Darwin had of humanity as being noble and distinct, though continuous with other species, will become evident, once again, with further developments in the work of sociobiologists, and, perhaps, by inference, evolutionary psychologists.
Instead of questioning the whole enterprise on the grounds of the fundamental objections made by sociobiology's critics (such as from Gould and R. Lewontin), Degler seemed willing to ignore such criticisms in the light of this positive outlook alone (if not by anything else).
What seems clear from this, therefore, is that, on Degler's account, sociobiology marks a paradigm shift back to the inclusion of biology in explanations of the differences human behaviour, not so much through any adherence to, once again, some reliable social scientific methodology, but by the same dynamics that Degler ascribes as the basis for the paradigm shift away from it earlier this century.
Needless to say, this suggests that the movement already has many supporters both within and outside psychology, and the philosophy that led Degler to the conclusions in this book are likely to have many supporters.
Endnotes
(1) Degler, p. ix.
(2) Ethology is the study of the behaviour of wild animals in their natural settings. Ethology grew out of a descriptive practice among the upper class of the 19th century to observe and document the behaviour of different species of animals and plants. One of the pioneers of ethology (later to receive the 1973 Nobel prize for his work, along with Karl von Frisch and Nikolaas Tinbergen) lived long before the period ethology was to have this decisive influenceon social science-Konrad Lorenz.
(3) Degler, p. 62.
(4) Note, however, that he does not use the word 'paradigm shift'; this usage is mine.
|