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A rchive Date
[ 02-01-2004 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ Pakistan ]

      [http://www.canoe.com/Columnists/mansur_toronto.html

      Friend or foe?
      Nuclear-armed Pakistan is a black hole of terrorism
      By SALIM MANSUR -- For the Toronto Sun
      January 2, 2004

      The two failed assassination attempts recently made on Pakistan's president and military chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, remind us how fragile is the U.S.-led coalition against international terrorism organized by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network of Muslim fanatics and remnants of Afghanistan's Taliban.

      Of all the rogue states around the world, including North Korea, Pakistan as an openly declared nuclear-armed state is the most confounding strategic headache for the U.S. and its allies.


      The reason is simple. It is a state with just about all its functioning institutions, including the military, thoroughly infested by the ideology of Muslim fundamentalists, financed over the years by Saudi funds.


      The process of transforming Pakistan into a Muslim fundamentalist state coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The architect of this policy was the previous military dictator, Gen. Zia ul-Haq.


      It was Zia ul-Haq's decision to make Pakistan a staging ground for the war in Afghanistan, to receive Muslim recruits from Arab countries and beyond for waging this war, to train them militarily, to provide them with logistical support and a safe haven.


      In return, Pakistan received ample funds from oil-rich Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and U.S. funds and equipment designated for Afghan warriors poured into the country.


      Gen. Zia died mysteriously in a plane crash in July, 1988. He was reportedly killed by opponents of his Afghan policy, but his legacy continued after him.


      Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war was a bonanza for the military establishment and its nuclear ambitions. The goal of acquiring nuclear capability was first publicly announced by a politician, Ali Bhutto, and enthusiastically received by the population.


      Bhutto spoke about Pakistan acquiring an "Islamic bomb" to counter India acquiring a "Hindu bomb," and Israel possessing "Zionist bombs." Bhutto was hanged by Gen. Zia in 1979, yet the clandestine efforts to produce nuclear weapons - partly funded by Arab oil revenue - materialized and Pakistan detonated several nuclear devices in May, 1998.


      Pakistan's ruling establishment, not unlike the Saudi monarchy, has been a loyal ally of the U.S. despite its ideological leanings. During the decade-long war in Afghanistan, Muslim fundamentalism ironically served well the common purpose of all engaged there, including Osama bin Laden and his followers, in defeating the former Soviet Union.


      The equation was changed by 9/11. Since that fateful morning, Gen. Musharraf - having seized power in a military coup by ousting an elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, in October, 1999 - steered Pakistan away from its fundamentalist clients in Afghanistan and has supported the war against terrorism.


      But the pro-Taliban sentiments and anti-Americanism are deeply entrenched in Pakistan's society, trapped in widespread poverty, illiteracy, and sectarian violence while ruled by a brazenly corrupt and uncaring elite.


      Gen. Musharraf's policy situates him at cross purposes with former clients and allies of the Pakistani military. The army ranks are still full of officers trained under the former dictator, Zia ul-Haq, and they remain sympathetic to Muslim fundamentalists.


      The capture in March, 2003 of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the most senior al-Qaida operatives, in Rawalpindi, within the vicinity of the army headquarters, was indicative of the intimate links remaining between elements in the Pakistani army and terrorists.


      Moreover, recent disclosures confirming earlier suspicions of the Pakistani nuclear establishment trading technical knowledge with other rogue states, such as Libya and Iran, for profit illustrate the peril of nuclear proliferation in a much more dangerous post-9/11 world.


      Gen. Musharraf, despite the record of the army and his own role in it, provides the only precarious defence since 9/11 between Pakistan remaining a reluctantly responsible coalition partner of the U.S. and sliding into the black hole of terrorism where the presence of nuclear weapons is not a hypothesis but a terrifying reality.


      There is no doubt as to the intent of terrorists in eliminating Gen. Musharraf and throwing the entire region between India and Israel into a convulsion of a nuclear nightmare.


      It is uncertain how the West will respond should this nightmare become reality.


      Salim Mansur is a professor of political science at the University of Western Ontario. His column appears alternate Thursdays. He can be reached at smansurca@yahoo.ca Letters to the editor should be sent to editor@tor.sunpub.com


      World Fact Book (CIA)]


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