A rchive Date
[ 27-04-2003 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ Nationalism ]
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[http://www.msu.edu/~kunzfran/mc220h.htm
Who Controls the State?
How Nationalism Affects the Problems of Governance in The Contemporary World
Overview
One of the central themes in International Relations today is the battle over the state. Whatever conflict or trouble faced by an ethnicity or nation, whomever controls the state can often shift the balance of power in a given struggle. Historically, "the sovereign, centralized cohesive nation-state became the most advanced and hopeful development for internal order, external security, and material prosperity"(103). Perhaps, through the study of various cases, the validity of the traditional state can be re-examined. Is state power and interventionism the most effective way to solve problems regarding ethnicity, race, and nationalism?
Japan
In Japan, nationalism is born out of and reinforced by state action. For instance, through the control of education, the Japanese ministry of education attempts to obfuscate the truth regarding history, preferring to instill a sense of pride in its people. Instead of discussing the Rape of Nanking, the ministry promotes using figures like "Admiral Togo Heihachiro, whose exploits…were used to promote militarism" to the Japanese public for World War II (133). The ministry officially controls the quality of the texts, but " the system [for quality control] actually entails control of content" (ibid.). This is perhaps the side of collectivism which, imposed by government, resembles a right-wing form of collectivism, fascism. By instilling a sense of distinctiveness and collective values, the Japanese government more easily pursues activist policies in economic areas, as the trend towards the consolidated state continues.
The functions of the Japanese civil society and economy, through normal everyday operations, can provide for the desires of community, but with the government impetus, metastasizes nationalism. Business needs for communication skills prompt the use of "‘cross-cultural’ manuals," which according to the author may foster greater nationalism in the Japanese instead of allowing them to bridge it (139). Instead of recognizing linguistic differences, this literature promotes the all-powerful stereotype of the Japanese enculturated upon young students. Thus, the author labels this genre of Japanese distinctiveness (nihonjinron) as "secondary nationalism" which reinforces the state-controlled "primary nationalism" (137). I would argue, though, that absent a state which controls culture through schooling, that the "secondary nationalism," lacking the militarism of the first, would come to prevail in Japan. Of course, by the rubric, the literature of "American Exceptionalism" could fit into the same nationalistic category. Perhaps "nationalism" is too harsh a word for factual descriptions of a culture’s diversity, as much of the nihonjinron seems to focus on. Easily observed via cultural comparisons is the tendency of the individual Japanese to behave communally and stress order.
Northern Ireland
The powers of the state and the control of that power are the primary issues in the conflict over Northern Ireland. Both Protestants and Catholics feel that if governments more friendly to them were in charge of Northern Ireland, Britain for the Protestants, Ireland for the Catholics, that their culture would benefit from the state promotion of culture. In the Protestant community, " there is a ‘sense of siege, of retreat, almost of defeat’" according to a community worker (153). Therefore, it is logical to use state power to stop this "encroachment" on Protestant turf, as Northern Ireland’s indigenous government did in the past. Regarding birthrates, Protestants believe that "it is the [catholic] church which urges its adherents to bigger families and forces mixed-religion couples to bring up their children as Catholics" (152). Against such a conspiracy, only the British state can protect them. Catholics also see Protestants unfavorably. "Ascendancy" is a term posing a bitter historical memory for Catholics, as it described "exclusive Protestant rule of Ireland" in previous centuries (154). The causes of resentment between Catholic and Protestant, which have their origins possibly as far back as the Potato Famine and in the anti-Catholic attitudes of Britain almost, seem unimportant. Whoever controls the state, however, will win.
Israel and Palestine
Important to note is that there are many more ethnic conflicts than just Arab versus Jew. Within the Jewish community, there exists a struggle between forces preserving Judaism and those wanting a secular society. Tom Bethell notes in his January 1998 American Spectator article "Whose Country Is It?" that Israel was founded on principles different from what many Jews share. He notes Israel’s founder, Ben Gurion, once said " I am in favor of Bolshevism," endorsing the philosophy which the USSR used to discriminate against Jews, and that many of the founders were "secular socialists" (Bethell 18). The tensions between the old immigrants and many new orthodox and conservative Jews come to play in contemporary Israel, as Rabin’s assassination itself could be the embodiment of the orthodox/secular conflict. One other example is "the man appointed to head a committee to reform the history curriculum used media interviews ‘to compare orthodox Jewish children to Hitler Youth, the Bible to Mein Kampf, and the armed forces to the SS’" (Bethell 19). The dynamics of peace assume new meaning, given the struggles not just between Likud and Labor, but between those who accept the God of Abraham, and those who reject it. The struggle for state power, moreover, becomes important to each faction, as state coercion can be used to advance particular religions, philosophies, or lack thereof.
The analysis accompanying the Palestinian – Israeli conflict looks less at individuals and how to increase individual happiness, but focuses excessively on groups. Instead of trying to create communities of persons, " the Jews as a global unit and the Arabs as a global unit" come to dominate discourse; with the elevation of group rights over individuals, a collectivist tyranny much like the one Ben Gurion tacitly endorsed could occur (171). The author continues, saying that most view this as a conflict "between states," and this "negates the corollary of a right to self-determination" for "the Palestinians as a people" (ibid.). Part of the problem is that human rights are neglected; by treating Palestinians as a monolith, the element of individual action and rights has been ignored. While both Jewish and Palestinian struggles for civil rights emphasize collective action against tyranny, life cannot be a continual struggle with completely coordinated action; the dignity and worth of the individual must be respected. Important to note is the bias the Israeli founding gave against giving up land as "the folklore of labor Zionism... disdains the dismantling of any Jewish settlement" (182). The socialist ethos, while portrayed as one of pure good, has contributed to the conflict as well.
Kurdistan
The problem of Kurdistan is one of a lack of state, and of the repression to the Kurds from those states which rule over them. In Turkey, while not subject to Iraqi-style poison gas attacks, the Kurds faced the "Kemalist policy of assimilation, which worked to deny a separate identity to the Kurds" through assimilationist education, restrictions on language, and force (213). The press was censored, and whole villages could be removed at will. Turkey, in pursuing its policies, put the sanctity of the group – the dream of a united Turkish nation – over the wills of individuals. In the state, the Kurds see protection, as their culture could be advanced with coercive policies instead of the Turkish culture. Yet, even this is viewed as a dream, due to the fragmentation of the Kurdish nation. Being split mainly between Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the Kurdish culture reflects more the imprint of whatever policies those states forced upon them.
The Kurds, if left alone, posses the mechanisms for building culture without need for an interventionist state. They have been heavily influenced by mystical Islamic orders – usually called Sufi Islam, a branch of the Sunnis. In the North Caucuses, such religious organizations provided the structure, law, and order in society without and interventionist state. Resistance to foreign domination was facilitated by federal/tribal relationships, particularly the one led by Sheik Mansur in Chechnya in the 19th Century. The Kurds could have used this to their advantage, but the main Sufi orders have competing leaders, namely the Sufi Nakshibandi with ties to political leader Barazani opposes the Sufi Qadiri associated with Talabani (206). Perhaps these elements, under a more liberal and less repressive order, could have combined to promote the Kurdish culture. The Kurds may not have needed a state to flourish, given that; civil ties could have remained stronger.
Quebec
Many French Quebeckers feel that state intervention is the solution to a declining culture, and that their own nation-state is the way to pursue this. Dominique Clift notes a shift in attitudes in the 1980’s after a failed secession referendum and amidst economic prosperity. Quebeckers shifted from collective, nationalist and social-democrat to individualist, anti-nationalist and capitalist (315). Yet, this proved only a short-term shift. Long-term trends, established by Quebec’s Silent Revolution, proved to counteract this. Those trends, which included a decline in the participation in traditional Catholicism, a shifting of education from the church to the state, less hostility to modernity, but more hostility to English, and a decline in birthrate during an increase in prosperity (317). Not only is there a shift away from civil institutions and mediating institutions, but with a declining birthrate (possibly due to affluence, possibly due to a decline in catholic prohibitions on contraception), the culture becomes more susceptible to decline. Arguably, the strong French culture was preserved by institutions like the church, a high birthrate, and "old fashioned" attitudes. Modernity (and Post-Modernity) leaves Quebec devoid of these things, with the state ready to intervene. Essentially, Quebeckers want French culture without the backbone ( just as Marie Antoinette want the peasants to have and eat their cake too).
The role of the state is of paramount importance in the situation. In response to the decline in French culture in Quebec, restrictive laws against English schooling and advertising were imposed. English Canadians, like Charles Taylor, appease these measures by making identity and recognition a part of the state (323). What Taylor neglects however, is the fundamental decision on the unit, personal, level to decide on an identity to need recognition. Taylor neglects the institutions of civil society which can function to "recognize" an individual – a church parish, a community group, even neighborly relations between English and French Canadians which seem impossible due to the hostility between the cultures. Allegedly, " the anti-state rhetoric of the Mulroney government depreciated the value of the central government," yet as the author mistakenly does not realize the traditional conservative emphasis on individuals and less on central governments. While Mulroney may have been more successful had the culture been shifting away from government dependency, his intentions were noble. Current trends, expressed in the anti-Quebec rhetoric of Reform Party chief Preston Manning, show that English Canadians are unwilling to tolerate further abrogations of civil rights in Quebec.
Conclusions and Extrapolations
Nationalism and communal feeling is reinforced via many methods, coerced and free. The nihonjinron in Japan shows the voluntary reinforcement of culture by a society and a market economy. Those Japanese who consume that literature show that a society can propagate community and nationalism itself. Similarly, the Sufi Islamic orders which divide the Kurds, yet united others, also show the strength of non-state, voluntary societies. On the other hand, the Japanese government’s educational monopoly propagates a harsh, militaristic nationalism, despite the evidence of a functional sense of community from civil society. In Quebec, government interventionism replaced a civil society which propagated French culture. Contrast these two images: the Catholic Church and traditionalist culture never forced culture upon any citizens, nor did it need sign laws or French-only policies to survive. French Canadian nationalists discovered that the state, whom Max Weber postulated had a monopoly on the use of legitimate force, could accomplish what the people themselves were unwilling to do in civil associations.
More violent conflicts over the nationalism and ethnicity, in Northern Ireland and Israel, focus on the control of the state and monopoly of force. The Catholic and Protestant factions in Northern Ireland see the Irish Republic and the United Kingdom, respectively, as their saviors and champions. In Israel, the fight is not just between factions of Jews and Palestinians, but between those Jewish factions which honor Yahweh and those that dismiss the God of Abraham. Also, there is a tendency to remove the autonomy of the individual, and assign each person to their respective ethnicity, not just in Israel, but in most cases. Group rights replace human rights. Therefore, the right of the Turkish people to promote their culture infringes on the rights of the Kurds, of the Quebec culture to force the English minority to submit to their language. Clearly there are problems with this collectivist emphasis.
The contemporary state of the world, floundering as it is in the Post-Cold War Era, still must come to terms with the central cause of destruction and chaos in the twentieth Century. It is neither communism nor fascism that threatens the world, but the underlying operative principle of collectivism. Simply put, this is the consolidation and amalgamation away from individuals and their rights into groups and group rights. In the governmental sphere under collectivism, the civil society and economy blend into the state, consolidated under its control via regulation, coercion, or direct control. Individuals and their identity melt away, replaced instead by the fascist "Volk," or in English, nation or ethnicity. From communism comes the expansionary, activist state, which is unable to curtail its desire to control. Collectivist state control and direction, however, resolve this tension between Volk and state, directing culture as part of the state. It is not enough for an ethnicity to exist; it must also institutionalize itself into a government. This government no longer obeys such outmoded concepts such as laissez faire or natural law, but instead seeks to reengineer the society around it to the maximum benefit of the ethnicity, nation or Volk that controls the state. We no longer have an "Open Society", as Karl Popper called it, but the tyranny of the absolute truth of the nation-state. What are the strategies that effectively combat this phenomenon?
Certainly, a change in the hearts and minds of individuals are needed. Citizens who find themselves dependant on the state for welfare, health care, and education soon find themselves and their culture dependent on the will of the state. A strong civil society, with mediating institutions, can replace the sate and function better as a proselytizer of culture and ethnicity. Only then will the convulsions experienced globally subside.
 World Fact Book (CIA)]
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