A rchive Date
[ 31-07-2005 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ U.S ]
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[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8770160/site/newsweek/
Talking With the Enemy
Part of what's bringing these people to the negotiating table is their fear that Iraq's insurgency is being taken over by jihadists
By Fareed Zakaria
Newsweek
Aug. 8, 2005 issue - Gen. George Casey's remark last week that the United States might begin to draw down troops in Iraq reminds me of the words of another George almost 40 years ago. In 1966 a Republican senator from Vermont, George Aiken, had a solution to the morass in Vietnam: "Declare victory and get out." Casey's remarks were not in the same vein, but the basic idea appears to be similar—redefine success to a less demanding level. There's only one problem: the Iraqi insurgency has not yet agreed to this plan. And if it doesn't, leaving Iraq will mean that a large part of the country will remain highly unstable and serve as a training ground for jihadist terror groups. Avoiding that outcome must be the minimum definition of success in Iraq. The good news is there is a real prospect of achieving this new (more modest) goal.
The Iraqi insurgency is, broadly speaking, made up of two parts: a rebellion directed by Baathists and former generals that styles itself as nationalist; and a radical Islamic terror movement, filled with foreigners. America's goal must be to split the insurgency, which can be done only by co-opting some important elements of the Baathist movement. A senior non-U.S. diplomat, who has spoken to all the key figures in Iraq over the past two years, tells me that for months leaders of the insurgency have been putting out feelers that they would like to talk with the United States about a settlement. (U.S. and Iraqi civilian and military officials have confirmed various aspects of this story.) So far the United States has refused to go down this path. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's description of contacts between Army officers and local insurgents is accurate, but these contacts have been few and far between and, more important, neither side has any authority to negotiate anything. Salih al-Mutlaq, whose National Dialogue Council has links to the insurgents, argues that negotiating with them would cripple the jihadists. "If the Americans reach an agreement with the local [Baathist] resistance, there won't be any room for foreign fighters," he says.
My diplomatic source argues that the people he has talked to appear credible and are willing to be tested (by ceasing their attacks for a week, for example). Their message to him has been, "The United States is not our strategic enemy. Our strategic enemy is Iran. We want to end the war with America." That is why they insist on direct talks with the Americans. During Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's reign, they refused to deal with the Iraqi government. "Now their position appears to have softened," the diplomat says. "They will talk to this government, but the United States must be involved as well." They don't want sporadic conversations but rather a real political process.
Part of what's bringing these people to the negotiating table is their fear that the insurgency in Iraq is being taken over by jihadists. The latter kill civilians and foreign diplomats, and blow up mosques, which gets them publicity but enrages the Iraqi public. The Baathists claim that they are conducting a classic "resistance" against foreign and Iraqi government forces only.
Some politicians in Iraq are farther along on this route than the United States government is, and none more so than the ever-supple Ahmad Chalabi. According to the diplomat, Chalabi has talked to some of these Baathists and has discussed their demands with Iraq's two most senior political leaders, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari. Hakim is said to be opposed to their demands, and Jaafari is ambivalent. (A spokesman for Chalabi in Baghdad, Entifadh Qanbar, denied Chalabi had talked directly to "masked" insurgents, but he confirmed he has had discussions with groups like the National Dialogue Council. Allawi has long advocated such talks.)
The Baathists have several demands, chief among them the restoration of the Baath Party. "Again, here they have shifted," the diplomat says. "They would be willing to rename the party, but they believe that they should be allowed to contest for votes in Iraq and be a political player in the country." They also want a clear statement from the United States that its forces will leave Iraq—not right away, but within some reasonable time frame. In addition, they want the release of people imprisoned for what they claim are "political crimes"—i.e., being Baathists. Their other demands mirror the concerns of many Sunni leaders. "They are willing to make an exception for the Kurds," says the diplomat, "but they don't want a constitution that creates a weak center and strong regions." They are also opposed to the single-district electoral system, which places them in the company of many American and Iraqi experts.
Zalmay Khalilzad's arrival as the new U.S. ambassador in Iraq provides an opportunity to test these waters. Khalilzad is a superb diplomat who understands that insurgencies are difficult to defeat by military means alone. (And he knows that talking to people does not mean acceding to all their demands.) The United States has shifted its Iraq policy substantially over the past year. Having disbanded the Army and de-Baathified the government, it now advocates aggressive moves to co-opt the Sunnis. It should explore this next big step.
Write the author at comments@fareedzakaria.com.
© 2005 Newsweek, Inc.
© 2005 MSNBC.com
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