A rchive Date
[ 25-05-2000 ]
Category
[ Philosophy ]
sub-Categoy
[ Greek ]
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[Empedocles of Acragas
John Burnet
Empedocles and Parmenides
The "Four Roots"
Strife and Love
Mixture and Separation
The Four Periods
Our World the Work of Strife
Formation of the World by Strife
The Sun, Moon, Stars, and Earth
Organic Combinations
Plants
Evolution of Animals
Physiology
Perception
Theology and Religion
Empedocles and Parmenides
At the very outset of his poem, Empedocles speaks angrily of those who professed to have found the whole (fr. 2); he even calls this "madness" (fr. 4). No doubt he is thinking of Parmenides. His own position is not, however, skeptical. He only deprecates the attempt to construct a theory of the universe off-hand instead of trying to understand each thing we come across "in the way in which it is clear" (fr. 4). And this means that we must not, like Parmenides, reject the assistance of the senses. We soon discover, however, that Empedocles too sets up a system which is to explain everything, though that system is no longer a monistic one.
It is often said that this system was an attempt to mediate between Parmenides and Heraclitus. It is not easy, however, to find any trace of Heraclitean doctrine in it, and it would be truer to say that it aimed at mediating between Eleaticism and the senses. Empedocles repeats, almost in the same words, the Eleatic argument for the sole reality and indestructibility of "what is" (frs. 11-15); and his idea of the "Sphere" seems to be derived from the Parmenidean description of reality.
Parmenides had held that what underlies the illusory world of the senses was a corporeal, spherical, continuous, eternal, and immovable plenum, and it is from this Empedocles starts. Given the sphere of Parmenides, he seems to have said, how are we to get from it to the world we know? How are we to introduce motion into the immovable plenum? Now Parmenides need not have denied the possibility of motion within the Sphere, though he was bound to deny all motion of the Sphere itself; but such an admission would not have served to explain anything. If any part of the Sphere were to move, the room of the displaced body must at once be taken by other body, for there is no empty space. This, however, would be of precisely the same kind as the body it had displaced; for all "that is" is one. The result of the motion would be precisely the same as that of rest; it could account for no change. But is this assumption of perfect homogeneity in the Sphere really necessary? Evidently not; it is simply the old unreasoned feeling that existence must be one. Nevertheless, we cannot regard the numberless forms of being the senses present us with as ultimate realities. They have no phusis of their own, and are always passing away (fr. 8), so the only solution is to assume a limited number of ultimate forms of reality. We may then apply all that Parmenides says of What is to each one of these, and the transitory forms of existence we know may be explained by their mingling and separation. The conception of "elements" (stoicheia), to use a later term, was found, and the required formula follows at once. So far as concerns particular things, it is true, as our senses tell us, that they come into being and pass away; but, if we have regard to the ultimate elements of which they are composed, we shall say with Parmenides that "what is" is uncreated and indestructible (fr. 17). The elements are immortal, just as the single phusis of the Milesians was "ageless and deathless."
The "Four Roots"
The "four roots" of all things (fr. 6) which Empedocles assumed -- Fire, Air, Earth, and Water -- seem to have been arrived at by making each of the traditional opposites " -- hot and cold, wet and dry -- into a thing which is real in the full Parmenidean sense of the word. It is to be noticed, however, that he does not call Air aêr, but aithêr, and this must be because he wished to avoid confusion with what had hitherto been meant by the former word. He had, in fact, made the discovery that atmospheric air is a distinct corporeal substance, and is not to be identified with empty space on the one hand or rarefied mist on the other. Water is not liquid air, but something quite different. This truth Empedocles demonstrated by means of the klepsydra, and we still possess the verses in which he applied his discovery to the explanation of respiration and the motion of the blood (fr. 100). Aristotle laughs at those who try to show there is no empty space by shutting up air in water-clocks and torturing wineskins. They only prove, he says, that air is a thing. That, however, is exactly what Empedocles intended to prove, and it was one of the most important discoveries in the history of science. It will be convenient for us to translate the aithêr of Empedocles by "air"; but we must be careful in that case not to render the word aêr in the same way. Anaxagoras seems to have been the first to use it of atmospheric air.
Empedocles also called the "four roots" by the names of certain divinities -- "shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis" (fr. 6) -- though there is some doubt as to how these names are to be apportioned among the elements. Nestis is said to have been a Sicilian watergoddess, and the description of her shows that she stands for Water; but there is a conflict of opinion as to the other three. This, however, need not detain us. We are already prepared to find that Empedocles called the elements gods; for all the early thinkers had spoken in this way of whatever they regarded as the primary substance. We must only remember that the word is not used in its religious sense. Empedocles did not pray or sacrifice to the elements.
Empedocles regarded the "roots of all things" as eternal. Nothing can come from nothing or pass away into nothing (fr. 12); what is is, and there is no room for coming into being and passing away (fr. 8). Further, Aristotle tells us, he taught that they were unchangeable., This Empedocles expressed by saying that "they are always alike." Again, the four elements are all "equal," a statement which seemed strange to Aristotle, but was quite intelligible in the days of Empedocles. Above all, the four elements are ultimate. All other bodies might be divided till you came to the elements; but Empedocles could give no further account of these without saying (as he did not) that there is an element of which Fire and the rest are in turn composed.
The "four roots" are given as an exhaustive enumeration of the elements (fr. 23 sub fin.); for they account for all the qualities presented by the world to the senses. When we find, as we do, that the school of medicine which regarded Empedocles as its founder identified the four elements with the "opposites," the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, which formed the theoretical foundation of its system, we see at once how the theory is related to previous views of reality. We must remember that the conception of quality had not yet been formed. Anaximander had no doubt regarded his "opposites" as things; though, before the time of Parmenides, no one had fully realized how much was implied in saying that anything is a thing. That is the stage we have now reached. There is still no conception of quality, but there is a clear apprehension of what is involved in saying a thing is.
Aristotle twice makes the statement that, though Empedocles assumes four elements, he treats them as two, opposing Fire to all the rest. This, he says, we can see for ourselves from his poem. So far as the general theory goes, it is impossible to see anything of the sort; but, when we come to the origin of the world (§ 112), we shall find that Fire plays a leading part, and this may be what Aristotle meant. It is also true that in the biology (§§ 114-116) Fire fulfils a unique function, while the other three act more or less in the same way. But we must remember that it has no pre-eminence over the rest: all are equal.
Strife and Love
The Eleatic criticism had made it necessary to explain motion. Empedocles starts, we have seen, from an original state of the "four roots," which only differs from the Sphere of Parmenides in so far as it is a mixture, not a homogeneous and continuous mass. It is this that makes change and motion possible; but, were there nothing outside the Sphere which could enter in, like the Pythagorean "Air," to separate the elements, nothing could ever arise from it. Empedocles accordingly assumed the existence of such a substance, and he gave it the name of Strife. But the effect of this would be to separate all the elements in the Sphere completely, and then nothing more could possibly happen; something else was needed to bring the elements together again. This Empedocles found in Love, which he regarded as the same impulse to union that is implanted in human bodies (fr. 17). He looks at it, in fact, from a physiological point of view, as was natural for the founder of a medical school. No mortal had yet marked, he says, that the very same Love men know in their bodies had a place among the elements.
The Love and Strife of Empedocles are no incorporeal forces. They are active, indeed, but they are still corporeal. At the time, this was inevitable; nothing incorporeal had yet been dreamt of. Naturally, Aristotle is puzzled by this characteristic of what he regarded as efficient causes. "The Love of Empedocles," he says, "is both an efficient cause, for it brings things together, and a material cause, for it is a part of the mixture." And Theophrastus expressed the same idea by saying that Empedocles sometimes gave an efficient power to Love and Strife, and sometimes put them on a level with the other four.
The fragments leave no room for doubt that they were thought of as spatial and corporeal. All the six are called "equal." Love is said to be "equal in length and breadth" to the others, and Strife is described as equal to each of them in weight (fr. 17).
The function of Love is to produce union; that of Strife, to break it up again. Aristotle, however, rightly points out that in another sense it is Love that divides and Strife that unites. When the Sphere is broken up by Strife, the result is that all the Fire, for instance, which was contained in it comes together and becomes one; and again, when the elements are brought together once more by Love, the mass of each is divided. In another place, he says that, while Strife is assumed as the cause of destruction, and does, in fact, destroy the Sphere, it really gives birth to everything else in so doing. It follows that we must carefully distinguish between the Love of Empedocles and that "attraction of like for like" to which he also attributed an important part in the formation of the world. The latter is not an element distinct from the others; it depends on the proper nature of each element, and is only able to take effect when Strife divides the Sphere. Love, on the contrary, produces an attraction of unlikes.
Mixture and Separation
But, when Strife has separated the elements, what determines the direction of their motion? Empedocles seems to have given no further explanation than that each was "running" in a certain direction (fr. 53). Plato severely condemns this in the Laws, on the ground that no room is thus left for design. Aristotle also blames him for giving no account of the Chance to which he ascribed so much importance. Nor is the Necessity, of which he also spoke, further explained. Strife enters into the Sphere at a certain time in virtue of Necessity, or "the mighty oath" (fr. 30); but we are told no more about that.
The expression used by Empedocles to describe the movement of the elements is that they "run through each other" (fr. 17). Aristotle tells us that he explained mixture in general by "the symmetry of pores." And this is the true explanation of the "attraction of like for like." The "pores" of like bodies are, of course, much the same size, and these bodies can therefore mingle easily. On the other hand, a finer body will "run through" a coarse one without becoming mixed, and a coarse body will not be able to enter the pores of a finer one at all. As Aristotle says, this really implies something like the atomic theory; but there is no evidence that Empedocles himself was conscious of that. Another question raised by Aristotle is even more instructive. Are the pores, he asks, empty or full? If empty, what becomes of the denial of the void? If full, why need we assume pores at all? These questions Empedocles would have found it hard to answer.
The Four Periods
It will be clear from what has been said that we must distinguish four periods in the cycle. First we have the Sphere, in which all the elements are mixed together by Love. Secondly, there is the period when Love is passing out and Strife coming in, when, therefore, the elements are partially separated and partially combined. Thirdly comes the complete separation of the elements, when Love is outside the world, and Strife has given free play to the attraction of like for like. Lastly, we have the period when Love is bringing the elements together again, and Strife is passing out. This brings us back to the Sphere, and the cycle begins afresh. Now a world such as ours can exist only in the second and fourth of these periods. It seems to be generally supposed that we are in the fourth period; I hope to show that we are in the second, that when Strife is gaining the upper hand.
Our World the Work of Strife
That a world of perishable things (thnêta) arises both in the second and fourth period is distinctly stated by Empedocles (fr. 17), and it is inconceivable that he had not made up his mind which of these worlds is ours. Aristotle is clearly of opinion that in our world Strife is increasing. In one place, he says that Empedocles "holds that the world is in a similar condition now in the period of Strife as formerly in that of Love." In another, he tells us that Empedocles omits the generation of things in the period of Love, just because it is unnatural to represent this world, in which the elements are separate, as arising from things in a state of separation. This remark can only mean that Empedocles assumed the increase of Strife, or, in other words, that he represented the course of evolution as the disintegration of the Sphere, not as the coming together of things from a state of separation. That is what we should expect, if we are right in supposing that the problem he set himself to solve was the origin of this world from the Sphere of Parmenides, and it is also in harmony with the tendency of such speculations to represent the world as getting worse rather than better. We have only to consider, then, whether the details of the system bear out this general view.
Formation of the World by Strife
To begin with the Sphere, in which the "four roots of all things" are mixed together, we note that it is called a god in the fragments just as the elements are, and that Aristotle more than once refers to it in the same way. We must remember that Love itself is a part of this mixture, while Strife surrounds or encompasses it on every side just as the Boundless encompasses the world in earlier systems. Strife, however, is not boundless, but equal in bulk to each of the four roots and to Love.
At the appointed time, Strife begins to enter into the Sphere and Love to go out of it (frs. 30, 31). The fragments by themselves throw little light on this; but Aetius and the Plutarchean Stromateis have between them preserved a very fair tradition of what Theophrastus said on the point.
Empedocles held that Air was first separated out and secondly Fire. Next came Earth, from which, highly compressed as it was by the impetus of its revolution, Water gushed forth. From the water Mist was produced by evaporation. The heavens were formed out of the Air and the sun out of the Fire, while terrestrial things were condensed from the other elements. Aet. ii. 6. 3 (Dox. p. 334; R. P. 170).
Empedocles held that the Air when separated off from the original mixture of the elements was spread round in a circle. After the Air, Fire running outwards, and not finding any other place, ran up under the solid that surrounded the Air. There were two hemispheres, revolving round the earth, the one altogether composed of fire, the other of a mixture of air and a little fire. The latter he supposed to be the Night. The origin of their motion he derived from the fact of fire preponderating in one hemisphere owing to its accumulation there. Ps.-Plut. Strom. fr. 10 (Dox. p. 582; R. P. 170 a).
The first of the elements to be separated out by Strife then, was Air, which took the outermost position surrounding the world (cf. fr. 38). We must not, however, take the statement that it surrounded the world "in a circle" too strictly. It appears that Empedocles regarded the heavens as shaped like an egg. Here, probably, we have a trace of Orphic ideas. At any rate, the outer circle of the Air became solidified or frozen, and we thus get a crystalline vault as the boundary of the world. We note that it was Fire which solidified the Air and turned it to ice. Fire in general had a solidifying power.
In its upward rush Fire displaced a portion of the Air in the upper half of the concave sphere formed by the frozen sky. This air then sunk downwards, carrying with it a small portion of the fire. In this way, two hemispheres were produced: one, consisting entirely of fire, the diurnal hemisphere; the other, the nocturnal, consisting of air with a little fire.
The accumulation of Fire in the upper hemisphere disturbs the equilibrium of the heavens and causes them to revolve; and this revolution not only produces the alternation of day and night, but by its rapidity keeps the heavens and the earth in their places. This was illustrated, Aristotle tells us, by the simile of a cup of water whirled round at the end of a string. This experimental illustration is much in the manner of Empedocles. It has nothing to do with "centrifugal force," but is intended to show that rapid motion may counteract a tendency to fall.
The Sun, Moon, Stars, and Earth
It will be observed that day and night have been explained without reference to the sun. Day is the light of the fiery diurnal hemisphere, while night is the shadow thrown by the earth when the fiery hemisphere is on the other side of it (fr. 48). What, then, is the sun? The Plutarchean Stromateis again give us the answer: "The sun is not fire in substance, but a reflection of fire like that which comes from water." Plutarch himself makes one of his personages say: "You laugh at Empedocles for saying that the sun is a product of the earth, arising from the reflection of the light of heaven, and once more 'flashes back to Olympus with untroubled countenance.'" Aetius says: "Empedocles held that there were two suns: one, the archetype, the fire in one hemisphere of the world, filling the whole hemisphere always stationed opposite its own reflection; the other, the visible sun, its reflection in the other hemisphere, that which is filled with air mingled with fire, produced by the reflection of the earth, which is round, on the crystalline sun, and carried round by the motion of the fiery hemisphere. Or, to sum it up shortly, the sun is a reflection of the terrestrial fire."
These passages, and especially the last, are by no means clear. The reflection we call the sun cannot be in the hemisphere opposite the fiery one; for that is the nocturnal hemisphere. We must say rather that the light of the fiery hemisphere is reflected by the earth on to the fiery hemisphere itself in one concentrated flash. It follows that the appearance which we call the sun is the same size as the earth. We may perhaps explain the origin of this view as follows. It had just been discovered that the moon shone by reflected light, and there is always a tendency to give any novel theory a wider application than it really admits of. In the early part of the fifth century B.C., men saw reflected light everywhere; some of the Pythagoreans held a similar view (§ 150).
It was probably in this connection that Empedocles announced that light takes some time to travel, though its speed is so great as to escape our perception.
"The moon was composed of air cut off by the fire; it was frozen just like hail, and had its light from the sun." It is, in other words, a disc of frozen air, of the same substance as the solid sky which surrounds the heavens. Diogenes says that Empedocles taught it was smaller than the sun, and Aetius tells us it was only half as distant from the earth.
Empedocles did not explain the fixed stars by reflected light, nor even the planets. They were made out of the fire which the air carried with it when forced beneath the earth by the upward rush of fire at the first separation. The fixed stars were attached to the frozen air; the planets moved freely.
Empedocles was acquainted (fr. 42) with the true theory of solar eclipses, which, along with that of the moon's light, was the great discovery of this period. He also knew (fr. 48) that night is the conical shadow of the earth, and not a sort of exhalation.
Wind was explained from the opposite motions of the fiery and airy hemispheres. Rain was caused by the compression of the Air, which forced any water there might be in it out of its pores in the form of drops. Lightning was fire forced out from the clouds in much the same way.
The earth was at first mixed with water, but the increasing compression causes by the velocity of its revolution made the water gush forth, so that the sea is "the sweat of the earth," a phrase to which Aristotle objects as a mere poetical metaphor. The saltness of the sea was explained by this analogy. It is taken for granted that the earth shares in the rotation of the vortex (dinê).
Organic Combinations
Empedocles went on to show how the four elements, mingled in different proportions, gave rise to perishable things, such as bones, flesh, and the like. These, of course, are the work of Love; but this in no way contradicts the view taken above as to the period to which this world belongs. Love is by no means banished from the world yet, though one day it will be. At present, it is still able to form combinations of elements; but, just because Strife is ever increasing, they are all perishable. The important part played by proportion (logos) here is no doubt due to Pythagorean influence.
The possibility of organic combinations depends on the fact that there is still water in the earth, and even fire (fr. 52). The warm springs of Sicily were a proof of this, not to speak of Etna. These springs Empedocles appears to have explained by one of his characteristic images, drawn this time from the heating of warm baths. His similes are nearly all drawn from human inventions and manufactures.
Plants
Plants and animals were formed from the four elements under the influence of Love and Strife. The fragments which deal with trees and plants are 77-81; and these, taken along with certain Aristotelian statements and the doxographical tradition, enable us to make out pretty fully what the theory was. The text of Aetius is very corrupt here; but it may, perhaps, be rendered as follows:
Empedocles says trees were the first living creatures to grow up out of the earth, before the sun was spread out, and before day and night were distinguished; from the symmetry of their mixture, they contain the proportion of male and female; they grow, rising up owing to the heat which is in the earth, so that they are parts of the earth just as embryos are parts of the uterus; fruits are excretions of the water and fire in plants, and those which have a deficiency of moisture shed their leaves when that is evaporated by the summer heat, while those which have more moisture remain evergreen, as in the case of the laurel, the olive, and the palm; the differences in taste are due to variations in the particles contained in the earth and to the plants drawing different particles from it, as in the case of vines , for it is not the difference of the vines that makes wine good, but that of the soil which nourishes them. Aet. v. 26, 4 (R. P. 172).
Aristotle finds fault with Empedocles for explaining the double growth of plants, upwards and downwards, by the opposite natural motions of the earth and fire contained in them. For "natural motions" we must, of course, substitute the attraction of like for like (§ 109). Theophrastus says much the same thing. The growth of plants, then, is to be regarded as an incident in the separation of the elements by Strife. Some of the fire still beneath the earth (fr. 52) meeting in its upward course with earth, still moist with water and "running" down so as to "reach its own kind," unites with it, under the influence of the Love still left in the world, to form a temporary combination, which we call a tree or a plant.
At the beginning of the pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise on Plants, we are told that Empedocles attributed desire, sensation, and the capacity for pleasure and pain to plants, and he rightly saw that the two sexes are combined in them. This is mentioned by Aetius, and discussed in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise. If we may so far trust that Byzantine translation from a Latin version of the Arabic, we get a hint as to the reason. Plants, we are there told, came into being "in an imperfect state of the world," in fact, at a time when Strife had not so far prevailed as to differentiate the sexes. We shall see that the same thing applies to the original race of animals. It is strange that Empedocles never observed the actual process of generation in plants, but simply said they spontaneously "bore eggs" (fr. 79), that is to say, fruit.
Evolution of Animals
The fragments which deal with the evolution of animals (57-62) must be understood in the light of the statement (fr. 17) that there is a double coming into being and a double passing away of mortal things. The four stages are accurately distinguished in a passage of Aetius, and we shall see that there is evidence for referring two of them to the second period of the world's history and two to the fourth.
The first stage is that in which the various parts of animals arise separately. It is that of heads without necks, arms without shoulders, and eyes without foreheads (fr. 57). It is clear that this must be the first stage in what we have called the fourth period of the world's history, that in which Love is coming in and Strife passing out. Aristotle distinctly refers it to the period of Love, by which, as we have seen, he means the period when Love is increasing. It is in accordance with this that he also says these scattered members were subsequently put together by Love.
The second stage is that in which the scattered limbs are united. At first, they were combined in all possible ways (fr. 59). There were oxen with human heads, creatures with double faces and double breasts, and all manner of monsters (fr. 61). Those of them that were fitted to survive did so, while the rest perished. That is how the evolution of animals took place in the period of Love.
The third stage belongs to the period when the unity of the Sphere is being destroyed by Strife. It is, therefore, the first stage in the evolution of our world. It begins with "whole-natured forms" in which there is not any distinction of sex or species. They are composed of earth and water, and are produced by the upward motion of fire seeking to reach its like.
In the fourth stage, the sexes and species have been separated, and new animals no longer arise from the elements, but are produced by generation.
In both these processes of evolution, Empedocles was guided by the idea of the survival of the fittest. Aristotle severely criticizes this. "We may suppose," he says, "that all things have fallen out accidentally just as they would have done if they had been produced for some end. Certain things have been preserved because they had spontaneously acquired a fitting structure, while those which were not so put together have perished and are perishing, as Empedocles says of the oxen with human faces." This, according to Aristotle, leaves too much to chance. One curious instance has been preserved. Vertebration was explained by saying that an early invertebrate animal tried to turn round and broke its back in so doing. This was a favorable variation and so survived. It should be noted that it clearly belongs to the period of Strife, and not, like the oxen with human heads, to that of Love. The survival of the fittest was the law of evolution in both periods.
Physiology
The distinction of the sexes was a result of the differentiation brought about by Strife. Empedocles differed from the theory given by Parmenides in his Second Part in holding that the warm element preponderated in the male sex, and that males were conceived in the warmer part of the uterus (fr. 65). The foetus was formed partly from the male and partly from the female semen (fr. 63): and it was just the fact that the substance of a new being's body was divided between the male and the female that produced desire when the two were brought together by sight (fr. 64). A certain symmetry of the pores in the male and female semen is necessary for procreation, and from its absence Empedocles explained the sterility of mules. The children resemble that parent who contributed most to their formation. The influence of statues and pictures was also noted, however, as modifying the appearance of the offspring. Twins and triplets were due to a superabundance and division of the semen.
Empedocles held that the foetus was enveloped in a membrane, and that its formation began on the thirty-sixth day and was complete on the forty-ninth. The heart was formed first, the nails and such things last. Respiration did not begin till the time of birth, when the fluids round the foetus were withdrawn. Birth took place in the ninth or seventh month, because the day had been originally nine months long, and afterwards seven. Milk arises on the tenth day of the eighth month (fr. 68).
Death was the final separation by Strife of the fire and earth in the body, each of which had all along been striving to "reach its own kind." Sleep was a temporary separation to a certain extent of the fiery element. At death the animal is resolved into its elements, which either enter into fresh combinations, or are permanently united with "their own kind." There can be no question here of an immortal soul.
Even in life, we may see the attraction of like to like operating in animals just as it did in the upward and downward growth of plants. Hair is the same thing as foliage (fr. 82); and, generally speaking, the fiery part of animals tends upwards and the earthy downwards, though there are exceptions, as may be seen in the case of certain shellfish (fr. 76), where the earthy part is above. These exceptions are only possible because there is still a great deal of Love in the world. We also see the attraction of like for like in the habits of different species of animals. Those that have most fire in them fly up into the air; those in which earth preponderates take to the earth, as did the dog which always sat upon a tile. Aquatic animals are those in which water predominates. This does not, however, apply to fishes, which are very fiery, and take to the water to cool themselves.
Empedocles paid great attention to respiration, and his explanation of it has been preserved in a continuous form (fr. 100). We breathe, he held, through all the pores of the skin, not merely through the organs of respiration. The cause of the alternate inspiration and expiration of breath was the movement of the blood from the heart to the surface of the body and back again, which was explained by the klepsydra.
The nutrition and growth of animals is, of course, to be explained from the attraction of like to like. Each part of the body has pores into which the appropriate food win fit. Pleasure and pain were derived from the absence or presence of like elements, that is, of nourishment which would fit the pores. Tears and sweat arose from a disturbance which curdled the blood; they were, so to say, the whey of the blood.
Perception
For the theory of perception held by Empedocles we have the original words of Theophrastus:
Empedocles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says that perception is due to the "effluences" fitting into the passages of each sense. And that is why one cannot judge the objects of another; for the passages of some of them are too wide and those of others too narrow for the sensible object, so that the latter either hold their course right through without touching or cannot enter at all. R. P. 177 b.
He tries, too, to explain the nature of sight. He says that the interior of the eye consists of fire, while round about it is earth and air, through which its rarity enables the fire to pass like the light in lanterns (fr. 84). The passages of the fire and water are arranged alternately; through those of the fire we perceive light objects, through those of the water, dark; each class of objects fits into each class of passages, and the colors are carried to the sight by effluence. R. P. ib.
But eyes are not all composed in the same way; some are composed of like elements and some of opposite; some have the fire in the center and some on the outside. That is why some animals are keen-sighted by day and others by night. Those which have less fire are keen-sighted in the daytime, for the fire within is brought up to an equality by that without; those which have less of the opposite (i.e. water), by night, for then their deficiency is supplemented. But, in the opposite case, each will behave in the opposite manner. Those eyes in which fire predominates will be dazzled in the daytime, since the fire being still further increased will stop up and occupy the pores of the water. Those in which water predominates will, he says, suffer the same at night, for the fire will be obstructed by the water. And this goes on till the water is separated off by the air, for in each case it is the opposite which is a remedy. The best tempered and the most excellent vision is one composed of both in equal proportions. This is practically what he says about sight.
Hearing, he holds, is produced by sound outside, when the air moved by the voice sounds inside the ear; for the sense of hearing is a sort of bell sounding inside the ear, which he calls a "fleshy sprout." When the air is set in motion it strikes upon the solid parts and produces a sound. Smell, he holds, arises from respiration, and that is why those smell most keenly whose breath has the most violent motion, and why most smell comes from subtle and light bodies. As to touch and taste, he does not lay down how nor by means of what they arise, except that he gives us an explanation applicable to all, that sensation is produced by adaptation to the pores. Pleasure is produced by what is like in its elements and their mixture; pain, by what is opposite. R. P. ib.
And he gives a precisely similar account of thought and ignorance. Thought arises from what is like and ignorance from what is unlike, thus implying that thought is the same, or nearly the same, as perception. For after enumerating how we know each thing by means of itself, he adds, "for all things are fashioned and fitted together out of these, and it is by these men think and feel pleasure and pain" (fr. 107). And for this reason we think chiefly with our blood, for in it of all parts of the body all the elements are most completely mingled. R. P. 178.
All, then, in whom the mixture is equal or nearly so, and in whom the elements are neither at too great intervals nor too small or too large, are the wisest and have the most exact perceptions; and those who come next to them are wise in proportion. Those who are in the opposite condition are the most foolish. Those whose elements are separated by intervals and rare are dull and laborious; those in whom they are closely packed and broken into minute particles are impulsive, they attempt many things and finish few because of the rapidity with which their blood moves. Those who have a well-proportioned mixture in some one part of their bodies will be clever in that respect. That is why some are good orators and some good artificers. The latter have a good mixture in their hands, and the former in their tongues, and so with all other special capacities. R. P. ib.
Perception, then, is due to the meeting of an element in us with the same element outside. This takes place when the pores of the organ of sense are neither too large nor too small for the "effluences" which all things are constantly giving off (fr. 89). Smell was explained by respiration. The breath drew in along with it the small particles which fit into the pores. Empedocles proved this by the example of people with a cold in their head, who cannot smell, just because they have a difficulty in breathing. We also see from fr. 101 that the scent of dogs was referred to in support of the theory. Empedocles seems to have given no detailed account of smell, and did not refer to touch at all. Hearing was explained by the motion of the air which struck upon the cartilage inside the ear and made it swing and sound like a bell.
The theory of vision is more complicated; and, as Plato makes his Timaeus adopt most of it, it is of great importance in the history of philosophy. The eye was conceived, as by Alcmaeon (§ 96), to be composed of fire and water. Just as in a lantern the flame is protected from the wind by horn (fr. 84), so the fire in the iris is protected from the water which surrounds it in the pupil by membranes with very fine pores, so that, while the fire can pass out, the water cannot get in. Sight is produced by the fire inside the eye going forth to meet the object. Empedocles was aware, too, that "effluences," as he called them, came from things to the eyes as well; for he defined colors as "effluences from forms (or 'things') fitting into the pores and perceived." It is not quite clear how these two accounts of vision were reconciled, or how far we are entitled to credit Empedocles with the theory of Plato's Timaeus. The statements quoted seem to imply something very like it.
Theophrastus tells us that Empedocles made no distinction between thought and perception, a remark already made by Aristotle. The chief seat of perception was the blood, in which the four elements are most evenly mixed, and especially the blood near the heart (fr. 105). This does not, however, exclude the idea that other parts of the body may perceive also; indeed, Empedocles held that all things have their share of thought (fr. 103). But the blood was specially sensitive because of its finer mixture. From this it naturally follows that Empedocles adopted the view, already maintained in the Second Part of the poem of Parmenides (fr. 16), that our knowledge varies with the varying constitution of our bodies (fr. 106).
Theology and Religion
The theoretical theology of Empedocles reminds us of Xenophanes, his practical religious teaching of Pythagoras and the Orphics. We are told in the earlier part of the poem that certain "gods" are composed of the elements; and that therefore though they "live long lives" they must pass away (fr. 21). The elements and the Sphere are also called gods, but that is in quite another sense of the word, and the elements do not pass away.
If we turn to the religious teaching of the Purifications, we find that everything turns on the doctrine of transmigration. On the general significance of this enough has been said above (§ 42); the details given by Empedocles are peculiar. According to a decree of Necessity, "daemons" who have sinned are forced to wander from their home in heaven for three times ten thousand seasons (fr. 115). He himself is such an exiled divinity, and has fallen from his high estate because he put his trust in raving Strife. The four elements toss him from one to the other with loathing; and so he has not only been a human being and a plant, but even a fish. The only way to purify oneself from the taint of original sin is by the cultivation of ceremonial holiness, by purifications, and abstinence from animal flesh. For the animals are our kinsmen (fr. 137), and it is parricide to lay hands on them. In all this there are certain points of contact with the cosmology. We have the "mighty oath" (fr. 115; cf. fr. 30), the four elements, Hate as the source of original sin, and Cypris as queen in the Golden Age (fr. 128). But these points are not fundamental, and the cosmological system of Empedocles leaves no room for an immortal soul, which is presupposed by the Purifications. All through this period, there seems to have been a gulf between men's religious beliefs, if they had any, and their cosmological views. The few points of contact we have mentioned may have been enough to hide this from Empedocles himself.]
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