A rchive Date
[ 19-06-2003 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ Iraq ]
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[http://www.canoe.ca/Columnists/mansur_toronto.html
Saddam may have secretly destroyed Iraq's WMD
By SALIM MANSUR -- For the Toronto Sun
June 19, 2003
The mystery of Saddam Hussein's missing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is not so mysterious when the matter is given sufficient thought.
There was no skepticism prior to the war about the existence of WMD among the Security Council's members, the Arab League, the European Union, the Liberal government in Ottawa and the leading news organizations in the West.
How else are we to explain the 12 years of UN sanctions against Saddam's regime for not complying unconditionally with the UN Security Council resolutions which required the full and comprehensive disarmament of Iraq's WMD?
All five permanent members of the Security Council kept these sanctions in place. Their effects were borne entirely by Iraqis, while illegal profits from smuggling goods in the UN oil-for-food program went into the coffers of Saddam Hussein and his family and friends. If, during this period, the WMD did not exist, or were inappropriately reported in terms of quantity and capabilities, then all members of the Security Council, not only the U.S. and Britain, bear the burden of imposing unjust sanctions on Iraq.
There is no need here to rehash arguments about how 9/11 changed global politics. The differences that developed in the Security Council after UN Resolution 1441 was unanimously passed on November 8, 2002 certainly had nothing to do with any disputes over the existence of Iraq's WMD.
The differences were over how to force Saddam's regime to comply with disarmament - whether to allow the UN inspectors to return for an indefinite period and engage once again in the charade of the preceding dozen years, or push ahead, as the Americans insisted, for regime change.
Before the first shot in the war was fired, there was no dispute on the matter of Iraq's WMD. This has only come up since the fall of Baghdad, and the inability of the coalition forces until now to locate WMD. Thus, a burgeoning controversy has arisen over whether the political masters in Washington and London exaggerated, or lied, about the existence and danger posed by WMD in order to justify regime change.
There are two likely explanations for the missing WMD.
First, they are hidden and those who have done the hiding will disclose their whereabouts. Eventually, WMD, like the "looted" artifacts of the Baghdad museum, will be found.
The second possible explanation is more intriguing. It is quite possible Saddam had his most trusted killers destroy the chemical and biological warfare agents after Dr. Hans Blix had listed them in his first UNMOVIC report to the Security Council on January 27, 2003.
The question then becomes why would he not report this to the world himself, and co-operate fully and immediately with the UN inspectors, thus taking away the Americans' main argument for regime change? A meaningful answer can only be appreciated in terms of the logic of the political culture within which he operated.
Saddam's Iraq, despite the rhetoric of Arab nationalism and socialism - and once the thin layer of acquired modernity with its rational values of the rule of law and individual rights had been removed - was tribal in politics and culture.
Saddam was an archetype tribal power-holder, a ruthless Arab Macbeth always on guard and wary of any lurking Arab Banquo. In Saddam's world , the primary concern was the honour and shame considerations of those holding power.
Individuals were inconsequential. Dissent was not permitted. Power-holders were tribal representatives who had seized power - as he had - but their grip on it was precarious and always open to challenge by other, equally ambitious tribal representatives. Saddam constantly spoke about dignity. In his mind he was indistinguishable from the Iraq he ruled. His concept of dignity can only be understood properly in the context of an honour-shame culture.
Under this theory, the despot could not publicly admit to his own tribe - to the Iraqis he trampled upon and to the rest of the Arab-Muslim world, where he portrayed himself as a modern day Saladin - that he had destroyed the WMD in his arsenal, the one terrifying instrument of control, intimidation and blackmail he possessed.
Quite possibly, he gambled, believing that the UN inspection team could be cajoled into reporting that Iraq no longer posed any credible threat to the world, without ever having to admit he had actually destroyed his weapons.
At a minimum, he may have calculated that the UN inspections , stretched out in a skillfully managed charade, would provide him with enough time to rearrange his resources and connections, both within and beyond Iraq.
Either way, Saddam certainly believed that time was his best asset, for he did not have to worry about the sands in the hour-glass of electoral politics as the American president did. For him, winning simply meant survival. At some point in the future, he could always rebuild what he had destroyed.
If this was what happened, then in the post-9/11 world, Saddam's gamble was a fatal miscalculation, both for himself and his tribe.
Salim Mansur is a professor of political science at the University of Western Ontario. His column appears alternate Thursdays. He can be reached at smansurca@yahoo.ca Letters to the editor should be sent to editor@sunpub.com
 World Fact Book (CIA)]
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