A rchive Date
[ 26-08-2002 ]
Category
[ International Relations ]
sub-Categoy
[ Israel ]
|
[http://www.observer.co.uk/review/story/0,6903,615586,00.html
Two wronged peoples
David Astor
Sunday June 4, 1967
The Observer
This is the second week of the crisis of Israel. The threatened blockading of the Gulf; the assertion by Prince Nasser that, if Israel attacks, his objective will be 'the destruction of Israel'; and the feeling that any clash might lead to World War - all this is sickening reminiscent of Europe some 30 years ago. Once again, it is the Jews who are in the position of chief victim - this time, in many cases, the children of those done to death in Europe.
In the thirties, although Germany had frontier grievances and mass unemployment, the situation in Europe was relatively calm and normal. By contrast, the status quo in the Middle East during the last 19 years has been exceedingly unstable. Israel's frontiers have not been formally recognised, guerilla warfare has been endemic; there has been a continuous state of semi-war.
Israel has maintained its existence only by watchfulness on all frontiers, reserves kept constantly at the ready, violations of the frontiers usually accepted with stoic calm, but sometimes answered by retaliation.
These differences between Europe in the thirties and the Middle East today have significance both for the objectives that it is sensible to pursue and for the means of attaining them. A comparison between Israel now and Czechoslovakia in 1938 is apposite.
Czechoslovakia's only aim was to retain its status quo. Israel's aim must be to improve a scarcely tolerable position. The Czechs would have done better for themselves by precipitating a general war as soon as they were touched: their only hope against Hitler would have lay in that course. But would Israel, which has virtually been living at war for 19 years, be likely to attain its different aim (of an improved local situation) by reacting to the blockade of the Gulf and Nasser's threatening speeches by taking the offensive?
To answer that question, the nature of Israel's situation must be considered as unemotionally as possible. And the basic fact of Israel's situation is that this little State was created where Arabs had lived.
That the Jews were morally justified in seeking a territory of their own cannot be questioned. But that the Arabs of Palestine should be obliged to give up most of their homeland to accommodate them was, obviously enough, unjust. A conflict between two deeply injured people has grown up. It is not a clash between the right and the wrong claim (as was the European conflict of the thirties) but a conflict between two wronged peoples. Unless it is appreciated that the Arabs have seen the Zionist immigration as the solving of a Christian problem at their expense there is no chance of discovering a means of improving Israel's situation among the Arab states.
An improvement of Israel's situation means one thing only: gaining political acceptance by the Arab states. In practice, it is a choice between seeking peace through indefinitely protracted holding operations and, ultimately, through negotiations. It is here that the irrelevance and hazards of reasoning by reference to Czech or other analogies becomes evident. For in the actual situation of Israel today, an offensive strategy and an attempt at peace-through-victory would, in all probability, prove catastrophic. Whereas a defensive strategy aimed at ultimate negotiations would - without being certain of success - have good hopes.
An offensive peace-through-victory strategy, whether conducted by Israel alone or by Israel and her Western friends, would certainly provoke among the Arab States an anti-imperialist reaction. This is because the Arabs do not feel like the Germans of yesterday, but like what they are - the still-humiliated Arabs of today. Whereas Nazi Germany could be defeated and made sober, defeated Arab States, feeling even more wronged, would become increasingly bitter and dangerous.
Moreover, the Arabs have means of frustrating an Israeli or Western military victory. First, Egypt can close or sabotage the Suez Canal. Second, the Arab States can call upon the Russians to support their resistance. The Russians could paralyse the situation: they could make an attack on an Arab State a risk of escalation into World War. But, supposing Israel and its Western friends opted for the more promising course of a defensive strategy, what hope is there of negotiations being ultimately successful? Would the Arabs, indeed, ever agree to negotiate? Could common ground one day be found?
Clearly the pre-conditions of success are that Israel should have demonstrated itself to be undefeatable, unaggressive and willing to bargain. Any bargain would, obviously have to leave Israel fully viable, both economically and militarily. But it would also have to make some concession to the perfectly reasonable sense of grievance felt by the Arabs. Is that compatible? It is never wise to argue another man's case for him: we would, therefore, be foolish to tell either the Arabs or the Israelis that they could safely make a compromise. What can be asserted, though, is that if no compromise is possible, then peace in that area is impossible.
It certainly appears possible to imagine concessions that could be offered to achieve the inestimable blessing of a peace settlement. Some Palestinian refugees could be taken back, although all the Jews who have come to Israel from Arab countries might have to be deducted from the number of the Arabs with a claim to return. The demilitarised zones, particularly on the Syrian border, could be internationally policed and minor frontier adjustments might be negotiated.
In the atmosphere of today, few Jews can believe that the Arabs could ever accept such concessions in settlement of their grievances and thereafter agree to live on good terms with Israel. But it is, at least, certain that they would be more than likely to accept, eventually, a peacefully negotiated agreement of this kind than that they would ever settle down peacefully after a further military struggle - particularly if the Arabs suffered more initial defeats.
In spite of the deeply-depressing dangers that beset the State of Israel, it has never been more important than today that its leaders should think like strong men, capable of restraint; like men of peace, who can understand the needs of others and who abhor war.
 World Fact Book (CIA)]
|